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Newman: The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Good Idea Badly Implemented

THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES:
A GOOD IDEA BADLY IMPLEMENTED
Jon 0. Newman*
The best way to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines is to candidly admit that they are a classic
example of a good idea badly implemented. I propose to consider how
the good idea originated, how the first Federal Sentencing Commission
implemented it, how the Supreme Court has dealt with the Sentencing
Guidelines, what is good about the Guidelines, what are the principal
defects of the Guidelines, and the most important step that can now be
taken to improve the Guidelines and realize the expectations of those of
us who favored sentencing guidelines.
I.

ORIGIN OF THE GUIDELINES

In 1974, Marvin E. Frankel, a highly regarded United States
District Judge in the Southern District of New York, wrote the pathbreaking book Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order.' Frankel
brought to the Nation's attention the major flaw in federal sentencing:
disparity. Sentences varied wildly among racial groups and from regions
to regions, and within regions.
To reduce sentencing disparity, Frankel urged Congress to create a
commission charged with the task of issuing a set of guidelines that
would modestly limit the extraordinarily broad discretion of federal
sentencing judges.
As a district judge at the time, I fully shared Judge Frankel's
concern. When an armed bank robber, for example, came before me for
sentencing, I could impose a sentence as high as twenty-five years and
as low as probation.2 Unlike any other area of the law, no statutes,
* Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. This Article is an
elaboration of my remarks at a conference at Hofstra Law School on October 23, 2017, marking the
thirtieth anniversary of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
1.

MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WrmouT ORDER (1974).

2. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 796 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(d) (2012)).
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regulations, standards, or criteria limited or even guided the exercise of
my discretion to select a sentence within that broad range. And if, after a
conviction for committing any crime, I imposed a sentence that most
observers would regard as shockingly high or shockingly low, there was
no opportunity for appellate review to revise the sentence.
Frankel's book led to the convening of a seminar at the Yale Law
School, led by Professor Daniel J. Freed, which met in the late 1970s to
explore possible sentencing reforms.3 Frankel and I both participated.
That seminar prepared a draft bill that served as the model for what
became the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ("SRA"), 4 Title II of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 ("CCCA").' The SRA was
sponsored by an unusual pairing of senators-Ted Kennedy and Strom
Thurmond. Kennedy sought to reduce the number and extent of
disparities; Thurmond wanted enhanced punishments.
The core of the SRA was the creation of a Sentencing
Commission,6 charged with the task of preparing a set of sentencing
guidelines.7 The SRA also substantially abolished parole, which had
authorized release of most prisoners after serving one-third of their
sentences,' and created limited appellate review of sentences,
3. At about the same time, the Chief Judge of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Irving R.
Kaufman, authorized another approach to sentencing reform-the Benchmarks Project. A
committee of five judges, including me, was given the assignment of formulating appropriate
sentences for about twenty hypothetical cases. These sentences were to be made available for
district judges throughout the Second Circuit to use as informal guidance when they encountered
comparable cases.
At the group's first meeting, we began our discussion with a typical case of theft. The first
judge suggested a sentence of five years. The next judge suggested two and one-half years. All the
judges prepared to break up the meeting, telling me that these two responses showed that agreement
was not possible. I asked each of the first two judges to state how much of their suggested sentences
they expected the defendant to serve before release on parole, which was then available. The first
judge said two years. The second judge also said two years. "You see," I told the group, "there is
agreement on how long the defendant in the case should remain in custody. The disagreement
concerns what sentence should be imposed to achieve that result." The judges differed only in their
prediction of the Parole Board's release decision.
Enlightened by this revelation, the group continued its assignment and achieved a remarkable
consensus on sentences for the twenty cases. These benchmark sentences were distributed to district
judges throughout the Second Circuit, and most reported they found them to provide very useful
guidance.

4. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.).
5. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28
U.S.C.).
6. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217(a), 98 Stat. 2017, 2017-18
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2012)).
7. See id. § 217(a)(1), 98 Stat. at 2019 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1)).
8. See id. §§ 223-236, 98 Stat. at 2028-33 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18,
21, 23, 26, 28, 29, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C). Under the prior law, some federal prisoners became

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol46/iss3/4

2

Newman: The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Good Idea Badly Implemented

2018]

A GOOD IDEA BADLY IMPLEMENTED

807

authorizing appellate courts to reject sentences that departed from the
applicable guidelines range to an unreasonable degree.'
The expectation of many proponents of the SRA was that the
seven-member Sentencing Commission would comprise people of
varied backgrounds, including perhaps a judge, a governor, a mayor, a
prosecutor, a defense attorney, and an academic. To the surprise of many
proponents of the SRA, including myself, the first Commission had
three professors.
Also disappointing expectations was the SRA's abolition of parole,
which was intended to promote truth in sentencing: a sentence of a
specific number of years would really mean confinement for that many
years, less only a one-seventh reduction for good time credits. Although,
as a result of the SRA, federal prisoners were no longer eligible for
parole, the abolition of parole did little to achieve its goal of altering
public perceptions of sentence lengths. Because more than ninety-five
percent of sentences are imposed by state courts and are subject to state
parole provisions, the public regularly learns though the media of
prisoners released on parole after serving only a portion of their
sentences. Most people mistakenly think that a federal prisoner is still
subject to early release on parole.
II.

THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES

Those of us who supported the SRA expected the Sentencing
Guidelines to be a fairly brief document, similar to the parole guidelines
previously used by parole hearing officers determining the time of a
prisoner's early release from custody. Those parole guidelines
comprised just three pages, plus some explanatory material. They
presented a table with six rows of offense categories, based on
seriousness of the criminal conduct, and four columns based on the
prisoner's prior record. At the intersection of each row and column, the
table set out a recommended range of months for a prisoner's release on

eligible for parole before serving one-third of their sentences if the sentencing judge imposed the
sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(1) (formerly 18 U.S.C. 4208(a)(2)). Some federal judges
imposed longer than usual sentences, expecting the reports of such sentences to promote general
deterrence, but imposed these sentences under section 4205(b)(1), expecting these sentences to be
ameliorated by parole earlier than the one-third point. Many years ago I obtained from the Bureau of
Prisons an analysis comparing the time served by prisoners not eligible for parole until the one-third
point with the time served by those eligible for parole earlier. For all offenses, those eligible for
earlier parole were serving more time than those not eligible for parole until the one-third point. I
reported these surprising results at a conference of judges within the Second Circuit. The district
judges were astonished to learn that their expectations had not been realized.
9. See id. § 3742, 98 Stat. at 2011 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)(C)).
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parole. Parole hearing officers were authorized to select a release date at
or above the recommended range if circumstances warranted.
In a slightly recast form, the parole guidelines table looked
like this:
TABLE 1: PAROLE GUIDELINES"
Low prior record

Fair prior record

High prior

Very high prior

0-3 points

4-5 points

record

record

6-8 points

9-11 points

10- 14 mnonthis

12- 16 mo1nths

Iwseverit

6-10 months

8-2

onths

Low-moderate

8-12 months

12-16 months

20-14 months

20-25 months

Moderate

12-16months

16-20 mo

s

2024 onhths

4-30 mniith

High severity

16-20 months

20-26 months

26-32 months

32-38 months

severity
offenses

offenses
VeTY

6

hm4

onths

,56

mon0

sevenity
offenses

Greatest

Too few cases to

Too few cases to

Too few cases to

Too few cases

severity

determine

determine

determine

to determine

offenses

Instead of a simple table in a three-page document, the first draft of
the Sentencing Guidelines, running to more than 200 pages, called for a
complicated table with 43 rows of offense levels, corresponding to the
seriousness of different types of offense conduct, and 6 columns of
criminal history categories, corresponding to prior record.
At the intersection of each row and column, the table set out a range
of months for a sentence. The current table, changed only in slight detail
from the first version, looks like this:
10. I became aware of the parole guidelines before they were published in the Federal
Register. One day during my second year as a district judge, I telephoned the U.S. Parole Board
(now called the U.S. Parole Commission) to ask a question about Board procedures and ended up
speaking with Maurice Sigler, then the Deputy Chairman. He asked if I would be interested in a new
guideline system the Board was using as a pilot project in the Board's Northeast Region. I said I
would. He sent me the parole guidelines, which I promptly published as an appendix to an opinion.
See Battle v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 925, 934 app.2 (D. Conn. 1973).
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TABLE 2: SENTENCING"
Criminal 1is ory Category (Critinal
Offense

istory Points)
V
VI
(13 or
(10,11,

I

IT

III

IV

(0 or 1)

(2, 3)

(4, 5,6)

(7 8, 9)

1-2)

more)

0-6

0-6

0-6

0-6

0-6

0-6

01-6

0-6

0-6

0-6,

1-7

0-6

0-6

2-8

3-9
6-1.2
9-15
1218;
15-21

Level

1
20-6

0-6
0-6
0-6

0-6
0-6

0-6
1-7

2-8
4-10

4-10
6-12

2_8
--

6-12

9-15

7
8

0-6

7
2-8

4-10

8-14

12-18

0-6

4-10

-12

10-16

15 21

18-24

9

4-10

6-12

8-14

12-18

18-24

21-27

1r0

6-12

8[14

10-16

15-21

2127

24-30

11

8-14
_ r

10-16
(-

12-18-

18-24

24-30
~

27-33

12-8

15-2

2733

18-24

24-30

30-37

33-41

1-27

27-33

3341

37-46

3
4
5
60-6

-

110-16

33

13

12-18

15-21

14

11

1

15

18-24

21-27

24-30

30-37

3746

41-51

i2.12

2430

274-33

3341

41-51

46-5 7

17

24-30

27-33

30-37

3746

46-57

51-63

s13i

27-33S

30-37

33L41

41-51%>< 1-63k

57-7rt

19

30-37
33-41

33-41
3-461

37-46
-41o5

46-57
51-63

57-71
6-8

63-78
08

37-46

41-51

46-57

657-71

70-87

77-96

20

21

,

16

46-57

51-

63-78

77-96

84-1 05

23

46-57

51-63

57-71

70-87

84-105

92-115

24

5 1-63

57_71

678

-96b

92-115S

100- 12

25

57-71

63-78

70-87

84-105

100-125

110-137

415

1

27

70-87

78-97

87-108

100-125

120-150

130-162

28

79

87-108

9

1

7

10-62

140-175

108-135

121-151

140-175

151-188

87-108

29

30
31

11.

-

97-121
-

71 108-13
5
108-135
121-151

121b151
135-168

j

13

11

35 151-188 1
68-210 823
151-188
168-210
188-235

Shown in months of imprisonment.
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32

121-151.

135-168

'151-166

168-210

188-235

2 .10-262t.

33

135-168

151-188

168-210

34
35

li-188
168-210

168-210
188-235

188-235
210-262

188-235
210-262
235-293

210-262
235-293
262-327

235-293
262-327
292-365

36
37

188-235
210-262

2 10-262
235-293

235-293
262-327

262-327
292-365

292-365
324-404

324-life
360-life

38
39

235-293
262-327

262-321
292-365

292-365
324-405

324-40
360-life

360-ife
360-life

3life
360-life

40
41

292-365
324-405

324-405
360-life

360-life
360-life

360-life
360-life

360-life
360-life

360-life2
360-life

60-life
360-life

360-life
360-life

36 0-ife
360-life

360-11l
360-life

360-lifei

360-lifet
360-life

42
43

.

360-life

The sentencing ranges were deliberately overlapped so that some
criminal conduct might fall within either of two adjacent ranges, thereby
eliminating a sentencing judge's need to make a precise finding as to
which of the two ranges was applicable. The idea of overlapping
ranges emerged in a conversation I had with Stephen G. Breyer, then a
First Circuit Judge and a member of the first Commission. Years later, as
a Court of Appeals Judge, I wrote an opinion achieving another benefit
of overlapping ranges: the sentencing judge need not select from
adjacent ranges if the judge would have imposed the same sentence
using either range.12
The Guidelines Manual provided detailed instructions to sentencing
judges for selecting an appropriate offense level. Starting with a base
offense level determined by the offense conduct, the judge added offense
levels for various factors such as infliction of injury. The most
significant adjustments were for the amount of money or the quantity of
narcotics involved in the crime. The original Guidelines set out twentyone levels, reduced now to sixteen, for different ranges of monetary
amounts, 3 and seventeen levels for different quantities and types of
narcotics.14 Even the number of offense levels added for injury varied
depending on whether the injury was "Bodily," "Serious Bodily," or
"Life-Threatening." 5
12.
13.

See United States v. Bermingham, 855 F.2d 925, 934-35 (2d Cir. 1988).
Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2Bl.1(b)(1), 2B2.1(b)(2) (U.S.

SENTENCING COMM'N 1987) [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 1987], with U.S.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 2B1.1(b)(1)

(U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016) [hereinafter

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2016] (providing a theft loss table).

14. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2016, supranote 13, § 2D1.1(c) (providing a
drug quantity table).
15. See id. § 2A2.2 (providing the injury adjustment for aggravated assault).
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Adjustments were also provided for the defendant's role in the
offense, with three categories of upward adjustments, depending on
whether the defendant was a "leader" of an organization with five or
more participants, a "manager" of such an organization, or a "leader" or
"manager" of a smaller organization," and two categories of downward
adjustments depending on whether the defendant's role was "minor,"
"minimal," or in between."
The Guidelines permitted sentencing judges to make a "departure,"
above or below the prescribed range, but the grounds for doing so were
severely limited." The principal downward adjustment was available for
rendering substantial assistance to the government. 19
The first draft of the Guidelines encountered considerable
opposition, based primarily on their complexity. A second draft made
modest improvements, but the final draft veered back toward the first
version. Since the effective date of the Guidelines in 1987, the
Commission has increased their complexity, adding about 800
amendments (some required by Congress) set forth in a Guidelines
Manual that now numbers more than 500 pages (not counting an
appendix and an index).20
III.

THE GUIDELINES IN THE SUPREME COURT

The extensive case law generated by the Guidelines is beyond the
scope of this Article, but the principal Supreme Court cases should be
noted. After hundreds of district and circuit judges had divided on the
constitutionality of the Guidelines, the Supreme Court settled the issue
by ruling them constitutional.2 1
The most significant Guidelines decision thereafter resulted from
the Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey.22 The holding in
Apprendi was that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."2 3 Applying Apprendi to the Guidelines, the Court ruled in United

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Seeid.§3B1.1.
See id. § 3B1.2.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 1987, supra note 13, § 5K1. 1.
See id.
Douglas A. Berman, Sentencing Guidelines, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PUNISHMENT, INCARCERATION, AND RELEASE 104-05 (Erik Luna ed., 2017).
21. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 362-63, 412 (1989).
22. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
23. Id. at 490.
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States v. Booker 24 that the mandatory aspect of the GuidelineS 25 was
unconstitutional for lack of jury fact-finding as to facts that determined
the applicable Guidelines sentencing range.26 After making that ruling in
the first part of Booker, the Court severed the SRA's provision making
use of the Guidelines mandatory, 27 and creatively proclaimed that
henceforth the Guidelines would be "advisory." 28 However, the Court
required sentencing judges to "take [the Guidelines] into account" before
using their discretion to make a non-Guidelines sentence.29 The Court
also ruled that appellate courts, reviewing sentences for reasonableness,
were to apply an "abuse-of-discretion" standard.3 0
In Rita v. United States, 31 the Court ruled that an appellate court,
reviewing a sentence, could presume that a sentence within an applicable
Guidelines range was reasonable.32 Then in Gall v. United States,33 the
Court ruled that an appellate court should review all sentences, "whether
inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range-under
a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard."34 More importantly, Gall
gave content to the "take into account" language of Booker by requiring
sentencing judges to "begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly
calculating the applicable Guidelines range,"" adding that "the
Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark." 36
IV.

WHAT'S GOOD ABOUT THE GUIDELINES

A.

Reducing Sentence Disparity

Before turning to my criticisms of the Guidelines, I think it's only
fair to point out their virtues. First, the Guidelines achieved some
reduction in sentence disparity. This is difficult to measure, but my
impression is that some sentences vary less from the sentences imposed

24. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
25. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1).
26. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 226-27, 244.
27. See id. at 249-65.
28. See id at 244-46 (Breyer, J., delivering opinion of the Court with respect to remedy).
29. See id at 264.
30. See id. at 260-63.
31. 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
32. See id. at 341, 347.
33. 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
34. Id. at 41.
35. Id at 49 (citing Rita, 551 U.S. at 347-48).
36. Id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2016, supra note 13, ch. 1 pt. A(2)
("[D]istrict courts are required to properly calculate and consider the guidelines when sentencing,
even in an advisory guidelines system.").
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on similarly situated defendants than would have occurred before
the Guidelines.
B.

Modified Real Offense

The Guidelines also reflect a sensible compromise between two
views as to what criminal conduct should be considered in making a.
Guidelines calculation. One view was that the range should be calculated
based only on the conduct for which the defendant had been convicted,
what the Guidelines called "'charge offense' sentencing." 37 Under the
other view, the range would be calculated based on all criminal conduct
associated with the offense (for example, possession of a weapon) that
the prosecution, at sentencing, could prove by a preponderance of the
evidence, what the Guidelines called "'real offense' sentencing.""
Rejecting both views, the Guidelines adopted what has been called a
"modified real offense" approach," whereby the offense level was based
on all acts of the defendant relevant to the offense and the foreseeable
acts of others in furtherance of the offense. 40
C.

Consecutive Sentences

One benefit of the Guidelines, rarely mentioned, is their response to
the often abused power of sentencing judges to impose consecutive
sentences upon defendants convicted of multiple counts. The most
extreme case I encountered as an appellate judge was a sentence of
twenty-six years resulting from eleven two-year sentences and one fouryear sentence, all imposed to run consecutively.4 1 The Second Circuit
remanded to require the sentencing judge to reconsider.42
The Guidelines curb abusive use of consecutive sentences by
providing that sentences for defendants convicted of multiple counts
should run concurrently, with just two exceptions.43 One exception is for
sentences required by statute to be imposed consecutively." The other
exception is for situations where the highest statutory maximum for any
count is less than the highest calculated Guidelines range for any one
count; in that circumstance, sentences are to be imposed consecutively,
37.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2016, supra note 13, ch. 1 pt. A(4)(a).

38. Id. ch. 1 pt. A(4)(a), § 6A1.3 cmt.
39. See United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 394 (2d Cit. 1992) (Newman, J.,
concurring).
40.

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2016, supra note 13,

§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(A),

(B).

41. See United States v. Golomb, 754 F.2d 86, 87, 89 (2d Cir. 1985).
42. Id. at 90-91.
43.

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2016, supra note 13,

44. See id.

§ 5G1.2.

§ 5G1.2(a).
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but only to the extent necessary to achieve the Guidelines sentencing
range.45 Of course, before Booker, sentencing judges could impose
consecutive sentences by making "departures," and, after Booker, could
do so by imposing non-Guidelines sentences.
V.

WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE GUIDELINES

A.

Complexity

The most serious defect of the Guidelines is their complexity. No
other Guidelines system has such extraordinary detail. The Guidelines of
many states, such as Minnesota and Pennsylvania, have sensible
guidelines requiring only a few pages.' It has been argued that the
Federal Guidelines needed to be so detailed because there are so many
federal statutory offenses. However, the parole guidelines managed to
provide parole release dates for those convicted of federal crimes and
did so in a three-page document.
Furthermore, the Guidelines became needlessly complicated when
the Commission endeavored to provide numerical offense level
adjustments for hundreds of factors such as carrying a weapon and
inflicting injury. Although such factors are relevant to sentencing, there
was no need to have them precisely quantified. Doing so led the
Commission to require sentencing judges to make detailed findings on
all sorts of matters and to make fine distinctions, such as whether a
defendant's role in an offense was "minor"; or "minimal" or something
in between.4 7
B.

"IncrementalImmorality"

At a philosophical level, a more fundamental defect was the
Guidelines' adoption of a sentencing principle that required every
increment of wrongdoing to result in an increment of punishment. For
example, even under the Guidelines' current loss table with its 16 levels
of loss for theft offense, 48 a theft of more than $6,500 requires an upward
adjustment of two offense levels and a theft of more than $15,000
requires an upward adjustment of four offense levels.4 9

45. See id. § 5G1.2(d).
46. See, e.g., MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY (MINN. SENTENCING
COMM'N 2017); SENTENCING GUIDELINES IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL (PA. COMM'N ON
SENTENCING 2018).
47. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2016, supranote 13, § 3B1 .2(a)-(b).
48. See id §2B1.1(b).
49. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(B), (C).
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Furthermore, the impact of an increment of money or drug quantity
increases significantly as the base offense level increases for various
offenses. At offense level 22, for example, a two-level increase for that
second $5,000 raises the minimum sentencing range from 41 to 51
months, nearly one year.5 o At offense level 36, however, the same twolevel increase for that second $5,000 raises the minimum sentencing
range from 188 to 235 months, nearly four years."
As I tried to explain to the Commission many years ago, no thief
wakes up in the morning and decides whether to steal $5,000 or $10,000.
He might choose between robbing a convenience store or a bank, but if
he selects a convenience store, he takes whatever is in the till.
The fortuity of that added $5,000 being there should not result in
added punishment.
Of course, crimes involving very large sums of money should incur
more punishment than crimes involving small amounts, but 16
gradations of loss carry that principle to an absurd length and require
sentencing judges to make detailed findings about the amount of loss.
The Commission's finely graded loss tables implement a philosophy I
have called "incremental immorality"-every increment of criminal
conduct deserves a precise increment of punishment.5 2 This is a principle
unknown to any punishment system in the world.
One vice of this approach is that punishments will often vary, not
by the venality of the offender, but by the work schedule of the
investigating agent. A busy postal inspector might end a mail fraud
investigation after three months, but an inspector not so busy might keep
his case going much longer, resulting in more violations (one for each
fraudulent mailing) and therefore a higher sentence.
C.

Weighting Money and Drug Quantities More
Than Role in the Offense

The numerous levels of the monetary loss tables and the many
levels of the similarly multi-layered tables for narcotics quantities reveal
another basic defect of the Guidelines. Amounts of money and quantities
of narcotics are the major determinants of sentencing ranges for financial
and drug crimes, while role in the offense is relegated to a slight
adjustment. The amount of money can increase a theft offense from

50. Id ch. 5 pt. A.
5 1. Id.
52. Jon 0. Newman, EasingMandatory Minimums Will Not Be Enough, JUDICATURE, Spring
2016, at 28, 29.
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offense level 6 to level 36;13 being the kingpin of a criminal drug
enterprise adds just four levels more than the level for an ordinary
soldier in the ranks.54 This has the tail wagging the dog.
Bean-counters count beans, and the architects of the Guidelines
counted amounts of money and quantities of drugs with great precision
because such items could be readily counted. Role in the offense could
not be so easily quantified, so the drafters settled for just three
gradations of organizational leadership.
D.

CumulationofAdjustments

The Guidelines' identification of scores of factors that warrant
primarily upward adjustments created a possibly unintended
consequence-very high sentencing ranges resulting from the
cumulation of factors frequently found in the same case. The
Commission identified most of these factors by noting that at least one
of them was present in many of the 10,000 cases that were examined in
formulating sentencing ranges and appeared to have persuaded the
sentencing judges in those cases to enhance particular sentences.
Requiring increased offense levels was reasonable for Guidelines
calculations where one or perhaps two factors were both present in the
same case. But the Commission appears not to have appreciated that
several factors were likely to be present in some cases. And, because of
the structure of the sentencing table, a factor that might result in a
modest increase in the sentencing range if it was the only factor, resulted
in a large increase when cumulated with other factors.
I encountered this phenomenon in an appeal by a defendant,
Gregory Sofsky, who pled guilty to receiving child pornography in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A). 5 His base offense level
was 17.56 To this level, the following levels were added: two for photos
of a minor under age twelve, 57 five for trading pornographic images, 58
four for depiction

53.

of violence,5

two for images transmitted by

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2016, supra note 13,

§ 2B1.1(a)-(b)(1).

54. See id. § 3B.1(a).
55. See United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 123-25 (2d Cir. 2002).
56.

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 2G2.2(a)

(U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N

2002) [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2002]; Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 124 n.1.
57. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2002, supra note 56, § 2G2(b)(1); Sofsky,
287 F.3d at 124 n.1.
58. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2002, supra note 56, § 2G2.2(b)(2)(A);
Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 124 n.1.
59.

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2002, supra note 56,

§ 2G2.2(b)(3);

Sofsky,

287 F.3d at 124 n.1.
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computer,"o and two for obstructing justice by erasing some computer
files.6 These adjustments increased his offense level to 32.
At Sofsky's base offense level, 17, with no prior convictions, his
sentencing range would have been 24 to 30 months. At the adjusted
level, 32, his sentencing range was 121 to 151 months. His adjustments
raised his minimum sentencing range by eight years and one month. Yet
most, and sometimes all, of Sofsky's adjustments are present in every
case of a defendant who sits at a computer and views child pornography.
Moreover, if the five-level adjustment for trading images had been the
only adjustment, it would have raised his minimum sentencing range by
17 months (a year and a half), but because this adjustment was
cumulated with other adjustments, it increased his minimum sentencing
range by 51 months (more than four years). Even the two-level
adjustment for using a computer, a factor common to virtually every
case of receiving pornography, would have raised his minimum
sentencing range by only six months had it been the only adjustment, but
when combined with the other adjustments, it raised his minimum
sentencing range by 17 months.
Sofsky received a sentence of ten years and one month, the bottom
of his Guidelines sentencing range. I understand the argument that those
who view downloaded child pornography at their computers deserve
punishment because they are indirectly supporting the market for such
images, but that market will continue to exist whether someone like
Sofsky serves less than two years, his base level sentencing range, or
more than ten years, his adjusted level sentencing range. Is ten years an
appropriate sentence? One way to answer that question is to note that
had Sofsky been convicted of producing child pornography, an activity
that directly risks harm to children, his base offense level would
have been 32, resulting in a sentence of 70 months, just under
62
six years.
Even before Booker made the Guidelines advisory, I wrote an
opinion for the Second Circuit allowing sentencing judges to make a
departure where a cumulation of adjustments produced a significant
increase in the calculated sentencing range. 63 Now, under the
advisory Guidelines regime, a cumulation of adjustments, such as
60. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2002, supra note 56,
287 F.3d at 124 n.1.
61.

§ 2G2.2(b)(5);

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2002, supra note 56,

§ 3C1.1;

Sofsky,

Sofsky, 287

F.3d at 124 n.1.
62.

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2002, supranote 56,

§ 2G2.1(a); Sofsky,

287

F.3d at 124 n.1.
63. See United States v. Lauersen, 348 F.3d 329, 343-44 (2d Cir. 2003), affd on reh'g, 362
F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2004).
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occurred in Sofsky, would obviously be an appropriate basis for a nonGuidelines sentence.
E.

Building on Statutory MandatoryMinimum Sentences

One defect of the Guidelines is required by Congress, and the
Sentencing Commission had to accept it, but did not need to make it
worse. The defect concerns mandatory minimum sentences.
Congress has enacted several statutes establishing mandatory
minimum sentences for certain offenses e.g., twenty years for a second
conviction for selling more than fifty grams of methamphetamine;"
seven years imposed consecutively for brandishing a weapon during a
drug trafficking offense. 5 With respect to the Guidelines, Congress
required the Commission "for each category of offense" to "establish a
sentencing range that is consistent with all pertinent provisions of
title 18, United States Code."66
Thus, for offenses subject to statutory mandatory minimums, the
Guidelines were required to set a sentencing range no lower than those
mandatory minimums. However, instead of just conforming sentencing
ranges to these minimums, the Guidelines needlessly built upon them
and set sentencing ranges on top of them. For example, for trafficking in
at least three kilograms of heroin the statutory mandatory minimum
penalty is ten years," and the base offense level under the Guidelines is
32, which, without a prior record, translates to a minimum sentencing
range of 121 months (ten years and one month). Upward adjustments,
for example for role in the offense, will raise the minimum sentencing
ranges higher than the minimums established by Congress.
Building sentencing ranges higher than statutory mandatory
minimum is inconsistent with the Commission's reason for existence.
The Commission was established to provide its expert view as to the
appropriate ranges of sentences for various combinations of offenses and
offender characteristics. To have been faithful to that responsibility, the
Commission should have begun setting the minimum range for selling
narcotics by using the number of years Congress required and then made
a final determination based on whether or not it believed, in the exercise
of its expertise, that any more severe punishment was appropriate.
Instead, the Commission imposed its entire system of adjustments on top

64.
65.
66.
67.

See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) (2012).
See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).
28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1).
See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(i).

68.

See U.S. SENTENcING GUIDELINES MANUAL2016, supra note 13,
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of statutory mandatory minimums that were already high. It is possible
that the Commission believed that the statutory minimums were too low
and wanted higher sentences, but it has never said so, and I think that
explanation is unlikely. By building on top of mandatory minimums, the
Commission missed an opportunity to lead, rather than follow.
F. Leniencyfor Cooperatingwith the Prosecution
The Guidelines authorize a departure for a defendant who "has
provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of
another person who has committed an offense."6 9 That departure,
however, is available only "[u]pon motion of the government." 70 By
giving the government control over whether a defendant's cooperation
can be rewarded with a lower sentence, the Guidelines place enormous
power in the hands of a prosecutor. The motion for a 5K1.1 departure
can be withheld even after a defendant cooperates if he has not provided
as much information as the prosecutor thinks he could give.71
Several years ago, I learned of a case where a defendant had
given useful information about six participants in the offense. The
prosecutor nevertheless refused to make a 5K1.l motion because the
defendant had not given information to help convict a seventh
participant. The defendant explained his reluctance: "She's my sister."
No prosecutor should be given so much leverage over a defendant. The
government motion requirement is not only unfair, it creates an incentive
for false accusations.
The Commission might have given this power to prosecutors out of
ignorance. At a sentencing institute many years ago attended by all the
Commission members, I asked why a cooperation departure required a
prosecutor's motion. "We did that," a commissioner replied, "because it
was always required before the Guidelines." There were gasps of
disbelief from a roomful of district judges, many of whom had been
federal prosecutors and knew that, before the Guidelines, sentencing
judges could reward cooperation without a prosecutor's permission. A
prosecutor could object, or dispute the extent of cooperation, but had no
veto power.72 Such power should be eliminated.

69.
70.
71.
72.
statutory

Id. § 5K1.1.
Id.
Id.
Congress required a government motion only for cooperation reductions below mandatory
minimums. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1).
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Acquitted Conduct

My last critique of the Guidelines concerns a matter most people
are unaware of and would be surprised to learn about. The Guidelines
provide that once a defendant is convicted on even one count, his
punishment should be based on "relevant conduct,"73 a category that
courts have interpreted to include criminal conduct described in counts
of which a defendant was acquitted.74
The Second Circuit encountered an extreme example of this aspect
of the Guidelines in United States v. Concepcion.75 In that case, Nelson
Frias was charged with three offenses that affected his sentence:
conspiracy to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)(A),
possession of an unregistered firearm in violation of 26 U.S.C.
§ 5861(d), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 7 6 He was convicted of the two weapons
offenses and acquitted of the heroin conspiracy.7 7 If he had been
convicted of all three offenses, his Guidelines sentencing range would
have been 210 to 262 months (17V 2 to 22 years). If he had been
sentenced only for the conduct resulting in the two firearms convictions,
his Guidelines sentencing range would have been 12 to 18 months (1 to
12 years). However, because the Guidelines permit conduct of which he
was acquitted, the heroin conspiracy, to be considered in determining his
sentence, his Guidelines sentencing range was 210 to 262 months (17/2
to 22 years), exactly the same as if he had been convicted of the heroin
conspiracy count. He was sentenced to 20 years, resulting from
consecutive maximum sentences on the two firearms counts.
The Second Circuit, applying its precedents,79 ruled that conduct
underlying counts of which a defendant had been acquitted was properly
considered in determining an adjusted offense level, and hence a
sentencing range.o Bound by circuit precedent to accept this use of
acquitted conduct, I concurred, but wrote separately to explain how this
bizarre result came to be."

73.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINESMANUAL2016,supra note 13,

§ 111.3.

74. See, e.g., United States v. Roland, 748 F.2d 1321, 1327 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v.
Sweig, 454 F.2d 181, 183 (2d Cir. 1972).
75. 983 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1992).
76. Id at 374.
77. Id at 393 (Newman, J., concurring).
78. Id at 389.
79. See, e.g., Roland, 748 F.2d at 1327; Sweig, 454 F.2d at 181-84.
80. See Concepcion, 983 F.2d at 386-89.
81. See id. at 393 (Newman, J., concurring).
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First, I pointed out that in adopting a "modified real offense"
approach, the Guidelines had used the concept of "relevant conduct," 82
that was broad enough to include acquitted conduct." Second, the
Guidelines "price" relevant conduct at the same level of severity as
convicted conduct. By that I meant that base offense levels and
adjustments, notably those determined by the multi-graded levels of the
monetary and narcotics quantity tables, counted acquitted conduct in
exactly the same way they counted convicted conduct, as long as the
latter qualified as relevant conduct.84
The third reason that acquitted conduct can significantly increase
sentences is not directly attributable to the Guidelines. Long before the
Guidelines, courts had used the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard
to establish proof of facts relevant to sentencing on counts of conviction,
whether or not the facts were the basis for a conviction.s That was
defensible when those facts were only eligible for consideration
by sentencing judges, but, under the Guidelines, the standard is
used to establish facts that are required to be considered at sentencing
and that affect sentencing to as great (or even greater) an extent as
convicted conduct.
At least this was true before the Supreme Court ruled in Apprendi
that facts used to enhance sentences, other than prior convictions, had to
be found by a jury.86 But once Booker rendered the Guidelines advisory
and avoided the Apprendi problem, sentencing judges were free to
resume using facts that they found by a preponderance of the evidence in
calculating the applicable sentencing range. And these facts include
acquitted conduct.
My opposition to use of acquitted conduct in making Guideline
calculations, especially pricing it as severely as convicted conduct, has
been shared by other judges.87
82.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2016,supranote 13,

§

111.3.

83. In Frias's cases, the use of acquitted conduct was technically based on U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(c), a cross-reference section for weapons offenses, rather than § lB1.3,
but my criticism of using acquitted conduct applied equally to both provisions, and I focus on
relevant conduct in this Article because it is the principal provision permitting use of acquitted
conduct to affect sentencing ranges. See Concepcion, 983 F.2d at 394 n.3.
84. For theft offenses, the base offense level and adjustments for monetary amounts are
applicable only in the event of a conviction for such offenses. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL 2016, supranote 13, § 2B1.1(a)(1). For other economic crimes, conviction is not required
to permit use of acquitted conduct as relevant conduct in the event of conviction for one or more

other offenses. See, e.g., id. § 2B2.1 (regarding burglary); id. § 2B3.1 (regarding robbery).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 818 F.2d 1052, 1057 (2d Cir. 1987).
86. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 473, 482 n.9, 483 n.10 (2000); see also U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2016, supranote 13,

87.

§

111.3.

See United States v. Frias, 39 F.3d 391, 393-94 (2d Cir. 1994) (Oakes, J., concurring)
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Of course, after Booker, a sentencing judge can circumvent all of
the defects outlined above (except complexity) by imposing a nonGuidelines sentence. However, many judges, required to start with a
Guidelines calculation in every case," stop their analysis at a point and
impose a Guidelines sentence.
VI.

IMPROVING THE GUIDELINES

A.

Simplification

I would like to see the Sentencing Commission remedy all of the
defects I have just outlined, but, facing up to reality, I will propose only
the one most urgently needed improvement: simplification. The
complexity of the Guidelines can be readily reduced and simplification
can be accomplished without entering the debate as to whether some
sentencing ranges are too lenient or too severe. A revision can be
punishment neutral. Here are a few steps that could be readily taken.
The number of levels in the loss tables for monetary crimes could
be substantially reduced. For example, the loss table for theft offenses
could be reduced from the current 16 levels, 89 to just four categoriessmall, medium, large, and very large. A simplified loss table for theft
offenses, reflecting the same severity as the existing table, might look
as follows:
$5,000 to $100,000
$100,000to $1 millin

increase 2 to 8 levels

million to $5 million
more than $5 million

increase 16 to 20 levels
+increase 22 to 30 evels

$1

Increase 10 to'14 levels

Similar reductions in the number of levels could be made for other
monetary loss tables and for drug quantity tables.
The role in the offense adjustments could be simplified, at current
levels of severity, by permitting sentencing judges to increase by two to
four levels depending on the judge's generalized assessment of the
defendant's role in the hierarchy of a criminal organization. This would
("As the Queen of Hearts might say, 'Acquittal first, sentence afterwards."'); United States v.

Hunter, 19 F.3d 895, 897-98 (4th Cir. 1994) (Hall, J., concurring) ("I agree with the Ninth Circuit
that a defendant ought not be punished for a charge on which he has been acquitted in the very same
proceeding."); United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 1991) ("We would pervert our
system of justice if we allowed a defendant to suffer punishment for a criminal charge for which he
or she was acquitted.").
88. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 47-48 (2007).
89.

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2016, supra note 13,
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eliminate the need for precise findings, for example, whether the
defendant was a "leader" or a "manager."9 0 The two gradations for a
mitigating role adjustment could be combined into one reduction of three
to four levels, without the need to determine whether the defendant's
role was "minimal" or "minor." 9 1 A more thorough revision, apart from
simplification, would provide much smaller increases for the drug
quantities and much larger increases for role in the offense so that a drug
kingpin's role would warrant an increase of 24 to 28 levels, a mule's role
would result in no increase, and drug quantities would have less effect
on the adjusted offense level.
Injury gradations could be combined so that injury for an
aggravated assault, for example, could result in an increase of three to
seven levels, eliminating the need to determine whether the injury was
"bodily," "serious bodily," or "life-threatening." 92 Similarly, the three
firearms gradations could be combined into an increase of three to seven
levels, eliminating the need to determine whether the firearm was
"discharged," "used," or "brandished." 93
Beyond these steps, many required adjustments could simply be
eliminated, leaving to the sentencing judge's discretion whether to raise
or reduce offense levels for circumstances now requiring adjustments.
B.

The Twenty-Five PercentIssue

Any proposal to simplify the Guidelines must reckon with the
twenty-five percent issue. The SRA requires that the top of any
sentencing range established by the Guidelines must not be more than
twenty-five percent higher than the bottom of that range.94 All of the
sentencing ranges in the Guidelines sentencing table conform to this
requirement. For example, in Criminal History Category I, the
sentencing range at offense level 17 is 24 to 30 months (30-24=6, and 6
is 25% of 24) and at adjusted offense level 37 is 210 to 262 months
(262-210=52, and 52 is 25% of 210).95
Some members of the staff of the Sentencing Commission have
argued that broadening the range of adjustments, such as I have
suggested above to achieve some simplification, would violate the
twenty-five percent requirement. Their theory is that if, for example, a
90. See id § 3B1.1(a)-(b).
91. See id. § 3B1.2(a)-(b).
92. Id § 2A2.2(b)(3)(A)-(C).
93. Id. § 2A2.2(b)(2).
94. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (2012).
95.

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2016, supra note 13, ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing

table).
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sentencing judge can make an upward adjustment of anywhere from 3 to
7 levels for the extent of a victim's injury, and the unadjusted offense
level, for example, would be 10, the judge would have discretion to
place the defendant in an adjusted offense level as low as 13 and as high
as 17. Under the sentencing table, the argument continues, this would
mean that the applicable sentencing range would be as low as 12 months
(the bottom of the range for offense level 13) and as high as 30 months
(the top of the range for offense level 17). This result, the argument
concludes, violates the twenty-five percent requirement because 30
months is 150% of 12 months (30-12=18, and 18 is 150% of 12).
I do not question the staffers' arithmetic, only their reading of
the SRA. The SRA states that the top of a sentencing range shall not
exceed the minimum of that range by more than the greater of twentyfive percent or six months.96 My proposal to combine categories of
adjustments leaves all current sentencing ranges unchanged, i.e., in full
compliance with the twenty-five percent requirement. The SRA imposes
no requirements on whether adjustments must increase or decrease base
offense levels by a fixed number of levels or a range of levels, nor on the
extent of any range of levels.97 I would read the SRA literally and not
extend the twenty-five percent requirement beyond its precise terms.
The Supreme Court gave substantial support to my reading of the
SRA in United States v. Kimbrough." The case concerned the 100 to 1
ratio that was then applicable to the weights of powder cocaine and
crack cocaine: for every gram of crack cocaine, the Guidelines' drug
quantity table used 100 grams of powder cocaine to set an offense level.
For example, offense level 12 was established for both 250 milligrams of
crack and 25 grams of powder, and offense level 38 was established for
both 1.5 kilograms of crack and 150 kilograms of powder.99
In Kimbrough, a sentencing judge imposed a non-Guidelines
sentence, concluding that the 100 to 1 ratio could be disregarded because
it was "disproportionate." 00 The Government argued that because the
statutes setting mandatory minimum sentences used the 100 to 1 ratio,
Congress had "[i]mplict[ly]" required the Guidelines to use the same
ratio and the sentencing judge could not ignore that ratio.' 0

96.
97.
98.

28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1)-(2).
Cf id.
552 U.S. 85 (2007).

99.

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2016, supranote 13,

§ 2Dl(c)(1),

(14); see

also Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 97.
100. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 93.
101. See id at 102 (quoting Brief for United States at 32, Kimbrough v. United States, 552
U.S. 83 (2007) (No. 05-6330)).
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The Supreme Court rejected the Government's argument because
"[i]t lacks grounding in the text" of the mandatory minimum statute. 10 2
Acknowledging that the statute sets a minimum and a maximum penalty,
the Court observed that "[t]he statute says nothing about the appropriate
sentences within these brackets, and we decline to read any implicit
directive into that congressional silence."l 03 Similarly, the SRA sets the
twenty-five percent requirement for the structuring of sentencing ranges,
but says nothing about the method for determining the extent of
adjustments that place a defendant within those ranges.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Thirty years ago, the Sentencing Commission proclaimed that "the
guidelines are evolutionary in nature." 1 0 Ten years ago, the Supreme
Court echoed the point: "The statutes and the Guidelines themselves
foresee continuous evolution helped by the sentencing courts and courts
of appeals in that process."1o

Unfortunately the evolution has not happened. Indeed, it has
not even begun. The structure and nearly all the details of the
original Guidelines remain unaltered, as do the premises underlying
them. Although the Commission has issued about 800 amendments since
the original Guidelines became effective in 1987, nearly all make
minor refinements, many required by congressional creation of new
statutory offenses.
Two changes of significance should be noted. In 2010, the
Sentencing Commission adjusted the Guidelines to comply with the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010, which modified the 100 to 1 weight ratio
between powder cocaine and crack cocaine to 18 to 1.106 In April 2014,
the Commission lowered drug offense levels by two levels, and made
that provision retroactive in July 2014.107
Now is the time for the Sentencing Commission to make a thorough
reappraisal of the Guidelines. The assignment should be entrusted to a
task force comprising a broad array of people with experience and
expertise in the administration of criminal justice.

102. Id.
103. Id. at 103.
104.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2016, supranote 13, ch. 1 pt. A.2.

105. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007).
106. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220,
U.S.C. § 2372 (2012)).

§ 2,

124 Stat. 2372 (codified at 21

107. See AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2DI.1(c) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N 2014); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION OF THE 2014 DRUG GUIDELINES AMENDMENT 1 (2014).
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The idea of promulgating guidelines to narrow the excessively
broad discretion of federal sentencing judges was sound. That idea can
be implemented in numerous ways. The guidelines of many states have
shown far more imagination and flexibility than the needlessly complex
system under which federal judges are now obliged to select sentences,
even under the post-Booker advisory guidelines regime.
Let the evolution begin.
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